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THE SUPREME CQU,RT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

J~A.\1 I~~

G.

~IORRISOX,

llc.'3})(J nde u t,

-vs.Case No. 9394

JOSEPH F. 1-fORNE, Director of
Zoning and Building of Salt Lake
County,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NA'Tl~RI~~

OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Order of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District granting a \-Vrit
of ~Iandamus directing the Director of the Zoning and
Building Inspeetion Departrnent of Salt Lake County
to i~~ue a building perrnit to James G. ~Iorrison
to allo"\v hin1 to build a service station on the X orth'vest corner of Seventh East and Forty-fifth South
Street~ in Salt Lake ( ounty contrary to the existing
1
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zoning ordinances applicable to that address. The que~
tion presented is as to the meaning of, and the validity
of Salt I.Jake Co11nty ordinances Title 8, ·Chapter +, as
a1nended, effective June 1;)~ 1957.
ST.A.TE~IENT

OF FACTS

The facts in this case are not in serious conflict
and 1nay be briefly sunnnarized as follo\YS :
Petitioner-Respondent has an interest 1n property
located on the K orth\\Test corner of the intersection
of Forty-fifth South and Seventh East Streets in Salt
Lake County, lTtah. which property 'vas first zoned
effective date Decen1ber 6, 1953 and has ever since
been zoned R3-A, 'vhich designation is for residential
use only and precludes any con1n1ercial use. A structure
suitable for a general store was upon the premises at
the time said Ordinance beca1ne effective, 'vhich structure
remained on the premises until it burned sometime in
1960; that from sometime in excess of one year prior
to the effective date of the Ordinance until the present,
the premises have been vacant and unused.
The evidence further sho,ved that Salt Lake County
has assessed the property in question based upon its
valuation as commercial property for the period 1955
through the year 1960.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Court issued its order
granting the Writ of Mandamus requested by PetitionerRespondent and Salt Lake County has appealed therefrom.
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Becau~e

of the natur~ of the proceeding there are
no Findings of F,act or Conclusions of Law front 'vhich
Appellant can determine the basis of the District ·Court
for its holding that the Writ of Mandamus should be
issued. For this reason Appellant is obliged to anticipate
in it~ brief all possible ju~tification for said holding
"~ith the rp~ult that its brjpf 1nay be so1newhat longer
than necessary· and 1nay eover areas not in serious
dispute. On the other hand it should be noted that son1e
guidance i~ given by I)etitioner-RPspondent 's trial brief
filed herein.
STATE~fENT

OF POIKTS

POINT I.
A NON-CONFORMING USE BEING AN EXCEPTION
TO THE ZONING ORDINANCE, THE BURDEN IS UPON
THE PARTY ASSERTING THE RIGHT TO SAID USE TO·
PROVE ITS EXISTENCE. THERE IS NO WHERE IN THE
RE·CORD OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENCE OF A
NON-CONFORMING USE EXISTING AT THE 'TIME THE
ZONING ORDINANCE CAME INTO EXISTEN·CE.
POINT II.
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT AT ·THE TIME OF THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE PETITIONER'S PREDECESSORS HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGH'T
TO USE THEIR PROPERTY NOT IN CONFORMANCE WTTH
THE ZONING ORDINANCE, SUCH RIGHT CEASED TO
EXIST PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY ORDINANCE TITLE 8, CHAPTER 4, SECTION 6,
AS AMENDED, EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1957, BECAUSE THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NO·T OCCUPIED BY A
NONCONFORMING USE FOR A CON'TINUOUS PERIOD
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OF ONE YEAR. IN ADDITION SAID RIGHT HAS BEEN
ABANDONED BY PETITIONER-RESPONDENT AND/OR
HIS PREDE·CESSORS.
POINT III.
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED, BY HAVING
ASSESSED THE PROPER'TY IN QUESTION UPON A COMMERCIAL VALUATION, FROM NOW DENYING THAT IT
CAN BE USED COMMERCIALLY FOR TWO REASONS.
1. IT IS NOT BOUND BY THE ERRONEOUS MINISTERIAL ACTS OF AN EMPLOYEE OF 'THE SALT LAKE
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE.

2. PETITIONER-RESPONDENT CANNOT BE SAID TO
HAVE REASONABLY RELIED ON SAID ASSESSMENT IN
VIEW OF 'THE NOTICE OF 'THE APPLICABLE ZONING,
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, FURNISHED BY THE
ZONING ORDINANCE ITSELF.
POINT IV.
EVEN IF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED
A RIGH·T TO USE HIS PREMISES NOT IN CONFORMANCE
WITH THE APPLICABLE ZONING ORDINANCE, THAT
NON-CONFORMING RIGHT IS ONLY TO USE THE PREMISES AS A GENERAL STORE AND NOT AS A RETAIL
GASOLINE STA'TION AS REQUESTED IN HIS APPLICATION FOR A BUILDING PERMIT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A NON-CONFORl\fiNG USE BEING AN EXCEPTION
TO THE ZONING ORDINANCE, THE BURDEN IS UPON
'THE PARTY ASSERTING THE RIGHT TO SAID USE TO
PROVE ITS EXISTENCE. THERE IS NO WHERE IN THE
RECORD OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENCE OF A
NON-CONFORMING USE EXISTING AT THE 'TIME THE
ZONING ORDINANCE CAME INTO EXISTENCE.
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Ameriran Juris prudence broad]~~ outlines the gen0ral
rule describing tltP part~· having the burden of proof
at 20 An1. J ur. 1:~s, Evidence Section 135, as follows:
dThe fundamental principle is that the burden of proof in any cause rests upon the party
\\·ho, a::-; deter1nined by the pleadings or the nature
of thP cas0, asserts the affirmative of an issue
and remains there until the ter1nination of the
artion."
This rule ha~ hPen applied to a rase involving proof
of a non-confor1ning USP in case of J(au.sa.-,· ('ity v. lVilhoit, ~>~7 S\\r 2d 919~ 1\1 etzenbau1n in his ,,·ork quotes
from that case at the top of page 1240 as follows:
'"In prosecution for violation of a zoning
ordinanct}, ,,·here provision that a nonconfor1ning
use existing at the ti1ne of the passage of the
ordinance 1night he continued, \\·as not part of
the enacting clause of the zoning ordinance nor
the part of the description of the offense involved
and ih;; provisions appeared in a separate section
of the ordinance, the defendant had the b1trden
of proving the nonconforming use of her property
and a continuation of such use until the dates of
the alleged violations."
''In prosecution for violation of zoning ordinance on ground that defendant \\·as using a
private residence for boarding or lodging more
than four persons, evidence did not establish
the defense of a nonconforming use of the residence existing lawfully at the tinze of the passage
of the zoning ordinance."
This reasoning is further supported by a discussion in
. .\LR 2d entitled '"Zoning-Resuming Xonconforming Use"
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at 18 ALI{ 2d page 728 Section 2, Subparagraph 3,
beginning at the botto1n of the first colu1nn of page 728,
as follows:
~'Turning

now to the effect which a discontinuance of a nonconfor1ning use has on the O\\'"ner's right to resume such use, it appear~ to be
'veil settled that the right of a property o'vner
to continue a nonconforming use will be lost
through the abandonment of such use before or
after the adoption of the zoning ordinance and
that compliance must thereafter be had with its
regulations. On the other hand, actions not
ainounting in la"'" to abandonment do not produce
this effect, and, therefore, a te1nporary cessation
of a nonconforming use or the temporary vacancy
of buildings used for a nonconforming use does
not in itself operate as an abandonment of the
nonconforming use, where the circunzstances, conditions, and statements of the owner are consist.ent
with or evidence of .an intention not to aba~ndon
the nonconformin-g use." (Emphasis added)
See also, 101 CJS 940 beginning at Section 18-! on
Zoning as follows:
"The rule permitting a landowner to continue
a nonconforming use of property in a certain area
applies only to a lawful nonconforming use which
existed at the time of promulgation of the zoning
ordinance or regulation. Normally the critical
date is that on 'vhich the regulation prohibiting
the use becomes effective rather than the date
of its passage-"
Petitioner has asserted in his petition at paragraph
2 thereof that :
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·'That PPtitioner and hi~ predeees~or in interest have a non-confonning com1nercial use in the
abovP desrribed property and have had such use
since 1941. And said property has been valued
and taxPd a~ coHnuereial propert~Y by ~alt Lake
ounty for the ~rear 1960 and for several years
last past."
1

(_

It appears then that the burden is upon PetitionerRPspondent to sho\\· that he is entitled to a non-conforming u~e in the instant case for other,vise he is clearly
In violation of the applicable zoning ordinance.
rrhe evidence in this case relevant to the use of the
pre1nises at the ti1ne of the effective date of the ordinance
is as follo"·s:
The effec-tive date of the applicable ordinance 'Yas
Deee1nher (), 1953 according to the uncontested testimony
of the zoning inspector (R. 16line 11)
Three ,,·itnesses testified concerning the use of the
propt>rty in question both before and after that date.
1lrs. lT rsenbach testified that she returned to her near-by
residence in October 1952, and that the property in
question \Yas vacant and unused, (R-15 Line 3) that
the la~t time she kne\v of the property being used was
in the spring of 19-+7 (R15 Line 24).
:Jfr. )lorrison's testimony on this subject is as follo\vs: He testified that he had been observing the property in question for the past four or five years and
that it had not been used during that time (R-18 Line 21).
He testified that he couldn't say definitely \vhen the store
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discontinued its operation (R-:~6 Line -±) and further
down that san1e page, testified that he has learned that
it discontinued its operation around 1953 or 1955, and
still later on that same page that he kne"'" the business
was there in 1950.
~fr.

l\{iller testified that he lived in the area and
that the store operated until 1951 or 1952 and that it
had been vacant since that time (R-29 Line 16 and 28).
\Vhere, as here, the building in question "\Yas not
being used at the time of the effective date of this zoning ordinance, it would appear that there not being any
use of the property, there could not be a non-conforming
use. The best that can be said in support of a non-conforming use is that if it can be sho,vn that there 'vas
an intention to continue the last use or at the very least
an intention not to abandon the prior use, then a nonconforming use may be found.
There being no evidence anywhere in the record
concerning the intention of the owner of the prenrises
to continue his for1ner use of the property at the time
of the effective date of the zoning ordinance, it is submitted that Petitioner-Respondent has not sustained his
burden to show the existence of a nonconforming use
of the property in question.
POINT II.
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT AT 'THE TIME OF THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE PETITIONER'S PREDECESSORS HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGHT
TO USE THEIR PROPERTY NOT IN CONFORMANCE WI'TH
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE ZONING ORDINANCE , SUCH RIGHT CEASED TO
EXIST PURSUAN'T TO THE PROVISIONS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY ORDINANCE TITLE 8, CHAPTER 4, SECTION 6,
AS AMENDED, EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1957, BECAUSE THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NOT OCCUPIED BY A
NONCONFORMING USE FOR A CON'TINUOUS PERIOD
OF ONE YEAR. IN ADDITION SAID RIGHT HAS BEEN
ABANDONED BY PETITIONER-RESPONDENT AND jOR
HIS PREDE·CESSORS.

Lake County Ordinance Title 8, Chapter +,
~Petion 6, as amended, effective J nne 15, 1957, provides
as follows:
~alt

HA building or structure or portion thereof

occupied by a nonconforming use, which is, or
hereafter becomes, vacant and remains unoccupied
by a nonconfor1ning use for a continuous period
of one (1) year, except for dwellings, shall not
thereafter be occupied except by a use 'vhich confornls to the use regulations of the zone in which
it is lora ted."
It is submitted that said language is unambiguous
and "Then applied to the facts in the instant case, the
only possible result is a finding that the land in <tuestion
1nay not be occupied except by use 'vhich conforms to
the use regulations of the zone in \vhich it is located.
. A.~ yet Petitioner-Respondent has not, ei thP r in his

argument or trial brief, ~atisfactorily anS\\rered or countered the provisions of this ordinance, nor has he indira ted
that it is for any reason invalid. The only suggestion
yet received concerning ho\\r this ordinance can be avoided
in this case is Petitioner's argument that said ordinance
duplicates the provisions of Salt Lake County Ordinance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Title 8, Chapter 4, Section 11, as amended, effective
June 15, 1957 which provides as follows :
•"The nonconforrning use of land, existing at
the tiine thi~ Ti tie becarne effective, n1ay be eontinned, provided that no such nonconforming use
of land shall in any 'vay be expanded or extended
either on the same or adjoining property, and
provided that if such nonconforming use of land,
or any portion thereof, is abandoned or changed
for a period of one (1) year or more, any future
use of such land shall be in eonfor1nity \vith the
provisions of this Title.''
And that the provisions of this latter ordinanee to the
effPct that if the use in question is abandoned then any
future use should be in conformity 'vith the zoning ordinanee somehow proscribes the operation of the former
ordinance.
In response to this argu1nent Appellant points out
that a fair reading of both provisions indicates that a
right to use land not in conforn1ance \Yith the zoning
ordinance may be lost not only by dis-use for a period
of one year, but additionally by abandonn1ent and additionally by a ehange of use for a period of one year.
Although it has not been suggested that the provisions of Salt Lake County Ordinance Chapter 8, Title
4, Section 6, are invalid, because 'Ye do not kno'Y on 'Yha t
factual or legal basis the case was decided in the lower
Court we feel constrained to support the proposition that
they are valid. To this end, the Court is invited to see
a three page discussion in ~Ietzenbaun1,
olun1e ~.

'T

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
pa~es 1~-+S

through 19;)0 \vherPin ~I etzenbaun1 cites as
the applieahle rulP in capital letters the holding of the
ea~P of J1.,ranner RPalitv l orr). v. Lebouf 109 K\TS 2d ;):.?G
.
'
a~ follo,Ys :
1

"AN ORDINANCE SETTING TWELVE MONTHS
OF "DISCONTINUANCE" OF A NONCONFORMING
USE, AS A BAR TO RESUMPTION OF SUCH USE,
HELD REASONABLE AND ENFORCEABLE, EVEN
THOUGH THERE BE NO EVIDENCE OF INTENDED ABANDONMEN'T OF SUCH NONCONFORMING
USE."

Thi8 ~a1ne case is again quoted at the 1niddle of
page 1:2-+9 in n[etzenbauln as follo,vs:
HThis leaves one remaining query: r~ the
ordinance, in so far as it attempts to abolish a
nonconforming use after non-user for one year,
valid and constitutional~"
Hln this connection it must be borne in 1nind
that the policy of the law is the gr.adwal elimimation of non-conforming uses and, accordingly, ordinances should not be given an interpretation
which would permit an indefinite continuation
of the non-conforming use. l\IeQuillin on l\Iunicipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, \:'" ol. 8, Section
25.189 and cases cited."
''The courts have gone far beyond holding
that mere nonuse for a specified period of time
may terminate the nonconforming use. In ,Standard Oil ·Co. v. C~ity of Tallahassee, 5 Cir, 1950,
183 F2d 410, 412, certiorari denied (1950) in 340
liS 892, 71 S Ct. 208."
~~It seems well established by the decisions,
that ordinances such as the one at bar are valid
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and constitutional. The only question that might
arise in each case is the reasonableness of the
period of tinte set forth in the ordinance. ThP
court is satisfied that the period of a year in the
ordinance herein is a reasona!Jle onP. The actual
period of Jl onuse herein has been five years since
the end of the \\·ar and eight years altogether."
As to 'vhether Petitioner-Respondent abandoned his
right to use his property not in conformance 'vith
the zoning ordinance (if he ever acquired it), please
refer to our argument that it 'vas lost by abondonment
prior to the effective date of the ordinance under Point
I above, and the argument "'"ith respect to burden of
proof also in Point I above, and add the additional
ingredient of approximately seven years of nonuse from
December 1953 to the fall of 1960 to establish the faet
of abandonment on the part of the Petitioner-Respondent
and his predecessors.
POINT III.
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED, BY HAVING
ASSESSED THE PROPER'TY IN QUESTION UPON A COMMER·CIAL VALUATION, FROM NOW DENYING THAT IT
CAN BE USED COMMERCIALLY FOR TWO REASONS.
1. I'T IS NOT BOUND BY THE ERRONEOUS MINISTERIAL ACTS OF AN EMPLOYEE OF ·THE SALT LAKE
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE.

2. PETITIONER-RESPONDENT CANNOT BE SAID TO
HAVE REASONABLY RELIED ON SAID ASSESSMENT IN
VIEW OF 'THE NOTICE OF THE APPLICABLE ZONING,
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, FURNISHED BY THE
ZONING ORDINANCE ITSELF.
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In support of its argument that Salt Lake County
is not Pstopped to deny a building permit to Petitioner
because of Prroneous asst•ssments by· an employee of
the Assessor's office, see an annotation at 119 ALR
1fl09, an 1\nnotation at 1 ALR :Znd :-t38 Section 7, and
~[etzenbatnn's diseussion beginning at page 162 Volun1e
1 of his three volume work.
Because the law seems to be reasonably clear in
favor of municipal bodies in this area, \\re offer only
t"ro representatives quotes from these discussions. At
I ALR 2d 351 2nd Column, the authors of ALR say:
"Ordinarily a municipality is not estopped by
a rnistake, unauthorized act, laches, dereliction, or
\\Trongful conduct on the part of a public. official,
and no estopel can gro'v out of dealings with
1nunicipal public officers of lirnited authority
\\rhere sueh authority has been exceeded."
And at page 352, bottom of first column, they add as
follows:
''So, as the collection of duly levied taxes
for governmental purposes is a governmental
function, the collection officer cannot by mistake
or misinfor1nation \Vork an estoppel against the
1nunicipality."
And at 119 ALR, 1512 at the very top of the first colmnn:
''.i\fost of the cases are to the effeet that a
municipality is not precluded from enforcing a
zoning or fire limit regulation by the fact that
one or more of its officers or servants has exceeded his authority by issuing a permit contravening the terms of such regulation; and this notSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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withstanding that the holder of the permit has
proceeded thereunder to his detriment before
the Inunicipality seeks to enforce the regulation
again:-;t him.''
Even if the doctrine of estoppel was applicable in
this casP, it cannot be said that the Petitioner-Respondent
reasonably relied on the assessment to his detriment in
view of the zoning ordinance itself, which gave him
con~tru<·tive noticP that the property in question "~as
not zoned commercially. In that regard see 101 CJS
700, Zoning s~etion 14, \\'hich section begins as follo"\YS:
~ •Every

property owner in a city is charged
\\·ith notice of the zoning ordinances; and even a
nonresident \\'"ho deals ,,·ith property "\Yithin the
limits of an unincorporated city is charged with
knowledge of the zoning ordinance of the city
regulating the u:-;e of such property. So, a purchaser of land is presumed to possess kno,vledge
of the restrictions in a zoning ordinance applicable thereto;"
POINT IV.
EVEN IF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED
A RIGH·T TO USE HIS PREMISES NOT IN CONFORMANCE
WITH THE APPLICABLE ZONING ORDINANCE, THAT
NON-CONFORMING RIGHT IS ONLY TO USE THE PREMISES AS A GENERAL STORE AND NOT AS A RETAIL
GASOLINE STA'TION AS REQUESTED IN HIS APPLICATION FOR A BUILDING PERMIT.

Salt Lake ·Count~· Ordinance Chapter 8, Title -!, Section 9 as an1ended, effective June 15, 1957, provides :
"'The nonconforn1ing use of a building or
structure 1nay not be changed except to a conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for1ning use: but \Yhere such ehange is n1ade, the
u~P shall not thereafter he changed back to a
nonconfor1ning- use."
.[\.s in the casP of

~alt

Lake L ounty Ordinance S--!--(i,
1

the languag-e of this ordinance is clear and unambiguous.
\ \re ha VP then onl ~r to dete r1nine if it is, for any reason,

invalid.
On this n1a.tter see 58 A1n. J ur., 1031, Zoning Section
166 as follO\\rS :
~~ '\Thether

and under \V hat conditions and
to ''That extent one nonconforming use may be
ehanged to another depends upon a number of
factors, including the tenns of the governing
statute or ordinance and the view of thP courts
or of the zoning authorities as to what constitutes
a Hchange'' and as to whether the circun1stances
of a particular case are such as to de1nand a
relaxation of the strict letter of the la\v. Ordinarily, the exemption granted by a zoning law to
the o\vner of land devoted to an existing nonconforming use is held not to confer the right to
change from one nonconforming use to a ne\v
and different one; the substitution of one nonconforming use for another is prohibited. The validity of a zoning la\v so provided or so interpreted
has been upheld as a proper exercise of the police
power, and the contentions rejected that the
regulation or restriction had no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare, was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or confiscatory, and operated to take
property \vithout due proce~s of la,v, or for a
public use without compensation."
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See also 18 ALR 2d, 739 Section 10, which begins :
'~The

substitution of one nonconforming use
for another constitutes such a discontinuance of
the original nonconforming use as to amount to
its abandonment. Whether or not the substituted
nonconforming use may be continued depends on
the specific provisions of the zoning regulation
involved."
and 'vhich other\vise supports the statement taken from
American Juris prudence quoted above.
SU~I~IARY

Appellant contends that each of its points, I, II and
1\T are sufficient standing alone to warrant a reversal
of the ruling of the district court. If we may be permitted
some liberty with the language we can state our position
as follows:
First: That there is no nonconforming use. Second:
If there 'vas one, it has been lost by nonuse. Third: If
it hasn't been lost it c.annot be ehanged to a service
station. Our Point III, of course, ha8 application to
our right to assert Points I and II.
\Y e ask that the ruling of the district court be

reversed and furthPr that if the court agreP:s 'vith
AppPllant that it ean be

reVt'r~ed

on the grounds urged

in our point 1I, that the courts' ruling be based on that
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point to the end that Salt Lake ( ount~· \viii have a
~tandard capable of rea~onably aeeurat(~ 1neasure1nent to
apply in its future efforts to enforce it:s zoning ordinanePs.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES
Salt Lake County Attorney
GERALD E. NIELSON
Deputy County Attorney
Civil Division
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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